

# Responsibility and automation in Socio- technical systems

*The case of air traffic management*


Giuseppe Contissa



Co-financed by the European Union  
Connecting Europe Facility


This Master is run under the context of Action  
No 2020-EU-IA-0087, co-financed by the EU CEF Telecom  
under GA nr. INEA/CEF/ICT/A2020/2267423





# Responsibility and automation

- How do we allocate responsibilities among the various participants in complex socio-technical organisations?
- In particular, what is the role of humans interacting with highly automated systems?
- Who is responsible for accidents in highly automated systems?



# “responsibility”

As captain of the ship, X was **responsible** for the safety of his passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was **responsible** for the loss of the ship with all aboard.



It was rumoured that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was **responsible** for his actions. Through out the voyage he behaved quite **irresponsibly**, and various incidents in his career showed that he was not a **responsible** person.


He always maintained that the exceptional winter storms were **responsible** for the loss of the ship, but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found criminally **responsible** for his negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was held legally **responsible** for the loss of life and property.

He is still alive and he is morally **responsible** for the deaths of many women and children.


*(Hart, H.L.A., Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 1970)*


# Liability (legal responsibility)






# Socio-technical systems: basic structure





# Socio-technical systems: examples






# The future of ATM

- In the time horizon of SESAR, that is over the next 30 years, a new generation of air traffic management systems will be developed.
- Such systems will be highly automated. They will make choices and engage in actions with some level of human supervision, or even without any such supervision.







# Automation and the future ATM scenario


- New generation of ATM systems to increase capacity, safety, efficiency and sustainability
- Higher levels of automation





# AUTOMATION SUPPORT





# Implications of automation

- Delegation of task from operators to technology
- Humans as controllers and supervisors
- Hybrid agency (symbiosis/coagency → joint cognitive systems)
- Machine intelligence and autonomy (= independence + cognitive skills)
- The challenge of complexity (technological, “many hands”)



# Automation: not all or nothing

- Not just **substitution of a human operator**
- Support to human capabilities in performing tasks




- Some degree of cooperation is usually required



# Automation: not all the same

Different tasks involve different **psychomotor** and **cognitive** functions, which in turn implies the adoption of different automation solutions.



# The level of automation taxonomy (SESAR 1)



From INFORMATION to ACTION →

INCREASING AUTOMATION



A	B	C	D
INFORMATION ACQUISITION	INFORMATION ANALYSIS	DECISION AND ACTION SELECTION	ACTION IMPLEMENTATION
<b>A0</b> Manual Information Acquisition	<b>B0</b> Working memory based Information Analysis	<b>C0</b> Human Decision Making	<b>D0</b> Manual Action and Control
<b>A1</b> Artefact-Supported Information Acquisition	<b>B1</b> Artefact-Supported Information Analysis	<b>C1</b> Artefact-Supported Decision Making	<b>D1</b> Artefact-Supported Action Implementation
<b>A2</b> Low-Level Automation Support of Information Acquisition	<b>B2</b> Low-Level Automation Support of Information Analysis	<b>C2</b> Automated <b>Decision Support</b>	<b>D2</b> Step-by-Step Action Support
<b>A3</b> Medium-Level Automation Support of Information Acquisition	<b>B3</b> Medium-Level Automation Support of Information Analysis	<b>C3</b> Rigid Automated <b>Decision Support</b>	<b>D3</b> Slow-Level <b>Support</b> of Action Sequence Execution
<b>A4</b> High-Level Automation Support of Information Acquisition	<b>B4</b> High-Level Automation Support of Information Analysis	<b>C4</b> Low-Level Automatic <b>Decision Making</b>	<b>D4</b> High-Level <b>Support</b> of Action Sequence Execution
<b>A5</b> Full Automation Support of Information Acquisition	<b>B5</b> Full Automation Support of Information Analysis	<b>C5</b> High-Level Automatic <b>Decision Making</b>	<b>D5</b> Low-Level <b>Automation</b> of Action Sequence Execution
		<b>C6</b> Full Automatic <b>Decision Making</b>	<b>D6</b> Medium-Level <b>Automation</b> of Action Sequence Execution
			<b>D7</b> High-Level <b>Automation</b> of Action Sequence Execution
			<b>D8</b> Full <b>Automation</b> of Action Sequence Execution

A condensed version of the LOAT matrix

# ROT / Use of video cameras in the control tower

## **A** **INFORMATION** **ACQUISITION**

**A0** Manual Information Acquisition

**A1** Artefact Supported Information Acquisition

**A2** Low Level Automation Support of Info Acquisition

**A3** Med. Level Automation Support of Info Acquisition

**A4** High Level Automation Support of Info Acquisition

**A5** Full Automation Support of Info Acquisition



The system supports the human in acquiring information on the process s/he is following. Filtering and/or highlighting of the most relevant information are up to the human.

# Activation of speed vectors by controllers

## **B** **INFORMATION** **ANALYSIS**

**B0** Working-memory based  
Information Analysis

**B1** Artefact Supported  
Information Analysis

**B2** Low Level Automation  
Support of Info Analysis

**B3** Med. Level Automation  
Support of Info Analysis


**B4** High Level Automation  
Support of Info Analysis

**B5** Full Automation  
Support of Info Analysis



**Based on user's request**, the system **helps** the human in comparing, combining and analysing different information items regarding the status of the process being followed.


# AMAN sequence of landing aircraft



The screenshot displays the AMAN system interface, showing a list of aircraft and their associated decision alternatives. The interface includes a top menu bar with 'Config', 'NonSeq', 'Meteo', and 'TLM' tabs, and a 'Login' button. The main display area shows a list of aircraft with their respective decision alternatives and associated data. The aircraft are listed in a table format, with columns for aircraft ID, aircraft type, and decision alternatives. The interface also includes a vertical time axis on the left and right sides, ranging from 15:20 to 14:24. The bottom of the interface shows a status bar with 'I W E TRK FPL MET 14 28'.

<https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/content/documents/nm/fasti-aman-status-review-2010.pdf>, page 16

The system proposes one or more decision alternatives to the human, leaving freedom to the human to generate alternative options. The human can select one of the alternatives proposed by the system or her/his own one.




# Autopilot

D ACTION IMPLEMENTATION	
D0	<u>Manual Action and Control</u>
D1	<u>Artefact Supported Action Implementation</u>
D2	<u>Step by step Action Support</u>
D3	<u>Low Level Support of Action Sequence Execut.</u>
D4	<u>High Level Support of Action Sequence Execut.</u>
D5	<u>Low Level Automation of Action Sequence Exec</u>
D6	<u>Medium Level Automat. of Action Seq. Execut.</u>
D7	<u>High Level Automation of Action Seq. Execut.</u>
D8	<u>Full Automation of Action Sequence Exec</u>



The system performs automatically a sequence of actions after activation by the human. The human can monitor all the sequence and can interrupt it during its execution.




# Some questions


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- How automation transforms operators' roles and tasks? What impact on their responsibilities?
- Who is responsible for the behaviour of systems that humans cannot fully monitor and control?
- Who is responsible for information supplied by automated systems that the human cannot verify?

# Level of automation and liability risk



- Increasing the level of automation will proportionally increase the liability risk for the **technology provider** and decrease the liability risks for the **human operator**.
- However, the employment of technologies with **intermediate levels of automation** may result in a high liability risk both for the technology provider and the human operator



# Fragmentation of tasks and liability

The **fragmentation of tasks** may results in uncertainty and complexity of procedures

## Human operator

- difficult to asses how and who should carry out each task
- high liability risk for negligence



## Technology provider

- difficult to design HMI to adequately support decision making and/or to provide exhaustive information
- high product liability risk, caused by design and information defects.




# Highly automated systems/AI systems: liability shift

**Liability** for injury/harm caused by technological failure **gradually** transferred to the **organisation(s) developing / using/ maintaining** the technology

Grounds for the attribution:


- Product liability (no-fault liability, grounded on **defectiveness**, in particular wrt design defects and warning defects)
  - Organisational / no-fault liability: generation of risks and ability to prevent them (and possibility to distribute losses)
  - Vicarious liability (for faults of employees, residual)
  - In the future: Liability for failing to deploy automated/AI systems?
- 
- Liability assessment should be carried out as soon as possible in the life cycle of technology.
  - Liability allocation related to level of automation of technology, in particular to the cognitive functions of the automated/AI technology and on the H-M interaction
  - To be assessed in relation to role of technology in accidents



# Highly automated systems/AI systems: liability shift /2

## **Individual liability** (*criminal/civil*, fault liability) would persist

- only when the human acted with an intention to cause harm or with recklessness (e.g. Just Culture)?... Or..
- always, human as «moral crumple zone» (Elish 2018)?
- What about decisions taken by humans when interacting with automated/AI systems?



# Other important issues on liability

## – Liability and standards/certification

- Liability shield for the producer?
- “Legitimate” expectation for the user/operator?
- Liability of certicators / standard setters


## – Right of recourse. Who will pay in the end?

- In complex systems, the *law may channel liability* towards one actor (e.g. in ATM, the air carrier), *but recourse against the one who had control* over the malfunctioning component of the system

## – The role of insurance


- Mandatory insurance for producers/manufacturers?
- Specific issues of highly automated /AI systems (cyber risk, wilful misconduct)

## – International context: “forum shopping”



# Open issue: Decision making authority


- **Effective decision-making authority in socio-technical systems**
  - Joint cognitive systems?
  - The model described (or prescribed) by laws, regulations, procedures:
    - Right not to be subject to (fully) automated individual decision-making (Art 22 **GDPR**): “[oversight of the decision] should be carried out by someone who has the authority and competence to change the decision” (Art29WP)
    - **Aviation**: ICAO Annex 2, sec. 2.3.1 Responsibility of pilot-in-command (ultimate authority, ultimate responsibility)
    - Vienna Convention on **Road Traffic**, Art. 1(v) "Driver" means any person who drives a motor vehicle or other vehicle (but amendments for ADS)
    - Art 14 new **AI ACT** proposal, human oversight for high-risk AI systems



# EFFECTIVE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY

What about decisions to be taken jointly with AI, in conditions of limited resources – time, information, explanations? E.g.:

- **Medical diagnosis** assisted by AI  
(Lagioia, Contissa 2020)
- **Frontex border** controls:  
«12 seconds to decide»



*Machine intelligence is fundamentally **alien**, and often, the entire purpose of an AI system is to learn to do or see things in ways humans cannot[..]*

*Ultimately, the **lack of a principled basis to contradict AI predictions implies that the reasonableness of an action in individual cases must be tied to the decision to use AI as a general matter.** (Selbst 2019)*

*Owing to the **evidence** in their favor (stipulated by definition), it is more appropriate to think of **expert robots as above average in their ability to make decisions that will produce desirable outcomes [...]***

*This fact suggests that **granting a general decision-making authority to human experts will be problematic once expert robots are properly on the scene.***  
(Millar, Kerr 2018)

# Legal Case


Step 1  
Understand  
the Context

## GATE 1

check completeness and suitability of background information




Step 2  
Identify  
Liability Issues




Step 3  
Address the  
Liability Allocation




Step 4  
Collect Finding and  
Systemic Analysis






# ACAS/TCAS II (TRAFFIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM)

<http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/TCAS>



- Visual and aural advices
- 2 types of advisories: **TA (Traffic Advisory)** and **RA (Resolution Advisory)**
- RA shall be executed by the crew; The system decides the best option and informs the human
- During the execution by the pilot the system provides guidance through continuous visual and aural feedback





# ACAS X and ADS-B

ACAS X will replace the current generation of systems ACAS/TCAS II

It will use new sources of surveillance data, including ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast)


ADS-B is an enabler for the change from radar based towards satellite based aircraft location systems.







# FOCUS OF THE CASE STUDY: ACAS X AND UNVALIDATED ADS-B POSITIONS

- The treatment of **unvalidated ADS-B positions** by ACAS X emerged as one of the controversial design issues with respect to liability.
- ‘Unvalidated’ refers to positions which are solely based on ADS-B data, not validated through other surveillance data sources.
- 4 design options debated by EUROCAE as in the diagram.



# ARGOS V0.1





# ARGOS modes of operations

L3

## ARGOS AS A DECISION SUPPORT TOOL

For all flights, ARGOS displays the best plan. The ATCO can approve the plan, impose a constraint to let ARGOS revise the plan, or come up with his/her own plan. For CPDLC flights, ARGOS executes the plan. For non-CPDLC flights, the ATCO is reminded and the plan is the default selection in the menus.

L5


## ARGOS MANAGES A SUBSET OF FLIGHTS

ARGOS manages certain flights (for each flight, a plan is presented and executed). The ATCO monitors and can take flights away from ARGOS. The ATCO controls all non-ARGOS flights.

L8

## ARGOS MANAGES ALL FLIGHTS

ARGOS manages all flights (for each flight, a plan is presented and executed). The ATCO is alerted by ARGOS when monitoring is required: ARGOS still manages the situation but outside its normal comfort zone (i.e. conflict-free look-ahead time is reduced). The ATCO monitors as requested (i.e. stays in L8). The ATCO can take flights away from ARGOS (i.e. revert to L5).



# SAFELAND

- Supporting flight and landing of aircraft operated by a single pilot, in case of partial or total incapacitation of the pilot.
- **Three implementation options:**




ATCO Focused:  
most of the single  
pilot tasks are  
assigned to the Air  
traffic controller



GSO Focused:  
most of the single  
pilot tasks are  
assigned to the  
Ground Station  
Operator



Automation  
Focused: most of  
the single pilot tasks  
are assigned to the  
cockpit automation



# SAFELAND

- Selected solution: GSO + Automation

